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European governance: the emergence of the EU25 
Towards the multilevel and multiactor governance 
(Closing Report with the overview of the main results – OTKA 64249) 
 
Introduction: institutional challenges in the EU 
 
There has been a strong pressure for the public administration reforms in the 
EU25, first of all in East-Central Europe (ECE). Basically, there have been two challenges 
in the EU that have to be answered: 
1. At the EU25 level there is a need to create new transnational regulatory 
institutions on the top as “metagovernance” and to introduce new common policies that 
radically transform the horizontal and vertical institutional relationships, in order to 
overcome the institutional crisis in the EU. At the same time the extension of the 
multilevel governance (MLG) and the multiactor participative democracy has to be 
continued, since the new transnational institutions have to be even more balanced with 
the structures of the mesogovernments (deepening). 
2. After the Eastern enlargement sharp tensions have emerged between the old 
and new member states in the workings of the EU institutions because the MLG 
structures – basically the mesogovernments in their inter-governmental relationships – 
are very weak the new member states. Hence the democratic institution building has to 
be completed in the new member states in meso- and micro-levels as well. Moreover, 
they have to catch up with the latest developments in the old member states as well as 
at the EU level (structural adjustment). 
The main message of this research summary is that in the EU the deficit is bigger 
in the effectiveness than the often mentioned democratic deficit. Therefore, it is more 
important and urgent in the EU to reform the “performance” than “democracy”, although 
it may be even more important to emphasize that in the participatory democracy it is in 
fact impossible to separate them, since the active democratic “participation” itself is the 
most important factor of “performance”. It has been the guidelines of the European 
governance since the seminal White Paper on Governance (Commission, 2001b) that was 
already prepared also from the MLG side (Commission, 2001a), although this dimension 
has come to the fore just in the second half of the 2000s. But as an analytical device, I 
will try to separate “democracy” (politics) and “performance” (policy) relatively in order 
to point out how to increase the “performance” or effectiveness through the MLG 
structures, which is high on the agenda everywhere in the EU (see Ambrosetti, 2009 and 
Bertelsmann, 2009). 
This paper addresses first of all the challenges of new member states against the 
background of the institutional reform in the EU, which has demanded enhanced 
structural adjustments as public administration reforms in the new member states. In 
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addition, it deals also with extending the European governance to two regions, the West 
Balkan states and to the Eastern neighbours, i.e. altogether with the relationships of 
deepening and widening from the special aspect of public administration reforms. 
Basically, the West Balkan states and the new neighbours have similar problems to a 
great extent with the new members: in both cases there is an institutional “Bermuda 
Triangle” at the level of meso-politics where the top-down efforts of Europeanization and 
Democratization “disappear”. In a word, the next step of democratic institution building 
in the East-Central European new member states as well as in the both the Balkan and 
the Eastern new neighbour states is to creating or further developing the multilevel and 
multiactor democracy that can be an institutional channel for their bottom-up 
Europeanization and Democratization. 
The new member states in East-Central Europe (ECE) have traditionally been 
centralized unitary states, with some democratization of macro-politics. Even the EU 
accession and post-accession has produced a counter-productive process because it has 
led to the re-centralization of the state under the EU performance pressure. The 
preference of the Commission has also been to negotiate with the central governments 
and not with the plurality of the weak, ignorant and non-representative social and 
territorial actors. Therefore, in the post-accession structural accommodation process of 
the new member states some concentrated efforts have been necessary for MLG type of 
public administration reforms. This is the political precondition to overcome the post-
accession crisis in the new member states. The experiences of these reforms can be 
transferred to some extent to the West Balkan and the East European regions. 
Multiactor democracy and capacity building in meso- and micro-politics are the two 
sides of the same coin, thus Democratization and Europeanization demand equally the 
development of the MLG structures, since with this kind of Europeanization the emerging 
democratic institutions will have also a higher performance. What is needed, effective 
regionalism and completing the system of organized interests, in which the task of nation 
states is not simply finding but forming, creating partners, i.e. the institution building on 
the top as “macrogovernance”, and also at the lower levels as “mesogovernance” and 
“microgovernance”. Nowadays democracy deficit appears in the “missing middle”, in the 
meso-governments as regional deficit and social dialogue deficit, i.e. in the growing 
regional disparities and in the increasing interest representation asymmetries. Similarly, 
a robust and vibrant but extremely asymmetrical civil society has emerged in ECE at the 
micro-levels, since the voluntary associations represent mostly the new middle classes 
and they are concentrated in the capital. 
All in all, the MLG type public administration reforms are high on the agenda in 
ECE and in the neighbouring states at all levels. In the 2000s NISPAcee has intensively 
dealt with the capacity of the central governments and with the “politico-administrative 
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relations” and it has also raised the governance issue at central and local levels (see e.g. 
Verheijen, 2001; Potucek, 2004; Rosenbaum and Nemec, 2006; and Connaughton, 
Sootla and Guy Peters, 2008). It is high time to shift the focus of research on the MLG 
approach that has been developed at length in several works above. 
 
I. From governance to multilevel governance 
 
General considerations – theoretical background in the EU documents 
 
Governance and communication have been two pillars of the performance oriented 
EU democracy that have been elaborated in the two White Papers of the European 
Commission in 2001 and 2006. The “governing the EU” has been the basic 
democratization program of the EU for bridging the gap between citizens and institutions. 
It has to take place at many levels and by many actors as multilevel governance and 
multiactor democracy in order to mobilizing, connecting and empowering the state and 
nonstate, public and private actors. Hence, the full “social” policy cycle (communication – 
participation – decision) has to be taken into consideration for the merger of the 
governance and communication strategies. The White Paper on Governance (2001b) 
already formulated the program of the extension of representative democracy through 
the multilevel governance, i.e. overcoming the problems of democratic deficit caused by 
missing participation through the mobilization of citizens and the empowerment of an 
organized or “articulated” society. The basic statement in the 2001 document is the 
following: “Reforming governance addresses the question how the EU uses powers given 
by its citizens. It is about how things could and should be done. The goal is to open up 
policy-making to make it more inclusive and accountable. (…) The quality, relevance and 
effectiveness of EU policies depend on ensuring wide participation throughout the policy 
chain – from conception to implementation.” (2001b:8,10). This statement admits that 
the EU was an elite business, but in the nineties the masses appeared on the scene 
because they were concerned by the extension of policies, therefore after Maastricht 
Treaty also the extension of the representative democracy has become absolutely 
necessary. The democratization program along the lines of governance was continued in 
2005 by the “Plan-D” (Commission, 2005). 
The starting point of the 2006 document on communication seems to be 
formulated in the same vein: “A partnership approach is essential. Success will depend 
on the involvement of all the key players – the other EU institutions and bodies; the 
national, regional and local authorities in the Member States; European political parties; 
civil society.” (2006:2). The 2006 document has also emphasized the involvement of the 
stakeholder forums, specific interest groups, or the decentralized approach in general. 
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Under the title of “empowering citizens” this document has outlined three steps: (1) 
improving civic education, (2) connecting citizens with each other and (3) connecting 
citizens and public institutions but it has been done at a very abstract level. Although the 
document has mentioned the actors – “professional and sectoral organizations” and the 
levels - “national, regional and local dimension” -, this has still not exposed the issue of 
“empowering” the citizens. European citizens come from widely diverse social and 
cultural background, therefore “empowering the citizens” means actually “nesting” them, 
i.e. involving their interest organizations in the policymaking process. Completing the 
development, the 2008 Debate Europe document has mentioned the participatory 
democracy – “The Plan D civil society projects showed that participatory democracy can 
successfully supplement representative democracy.” (2008a:5). 
Basically, the EU itself has emerged as a multilevel polity, as an organization in 
which the central executives (“metagovernance”) govern by sharing responsibility and 
authority with other supranational and subnational actors. Fritz Scharpf has clearly 
pointed out that the main failure of the theoretical literature is in the confrontation of 
intergovernmental and transnational models, since “the multi-level polity of the European 
Union is conceptualized in a single-level of intergovernmental interactions”, and these 
single level models are “ill suited to deal with multi-level interactions” (Scharpf, 2000:5). 
Even within the member states there is a plurality of the lower level, distinct governing 
modes, therefore “the coexistence of, and the interaction between, distinct levels of 
government” presupposes a “fusion” of governing functions as a structure of network 
governance. Thus, in the analysis of the EU polity one has to “take account of the multi-
level nature of European institutions and governing processes.” (Scharpf, 2000:7). 
In his Conclusion the MLG appears as the basic institutional feature of the EU: 
“The European polity is a complex multi-level institutional configuration which cannot be 
adequately represented by theoretical models that are generally used in international 
relations or comparative politics. (…) these difficulties could be overcome by a modular 
approach using a plurality of simpler concepts representing different modes of multi-level 
interaction that are characteristic of subsets of European policy processes.” Thus, “the 
same conceptual tools should also be useful for the analysis of subnational, national, 
transnational and other supranational policy-making institutions.” (Scharpf, 2000:26). 
Given the multilevel nature of European institutions and governing processes, according 
to his conceptual framework, the European governance has been based on the following 
multilevel interactions: 
1. Mutual adjustment – national governments continue to adopt their own policies 
nationally but they do so in response to, or anticipation of, the policy choices of other 
governments. 
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2. Intergovernmental negotiations – at the lowest level of institutionalization 
national policies are coordinated by agreements but national governments remain in full 
control of the decision-making process. 
3. Hierarchical direction – the mode in which competencies are completely 
centralized and exercised by supranational actors without the direct participation of 
member state governments. 
4. Joint decisions – it combines aspects of intergovernmental negotiations and 
supranational centralization as the openness of decision-making process to the demands 
of plural interests, to the networks of interest intermediation. 
Since the late nineties the MLG concept has become the mainstream approach in 
the European Studies from the international relations to the regional research, as the 
seminal book written by its prominent authors has demonstrated (see Bache and 
Flinders, 2004). The idea of MLG type of democratization with public administration 
reform has also been developed in several works of Guy Peters (see recently, 
Connaughton et al, 2008:8-11). It has been extended after the Commission‟s White 
Paper on Governance to several policy fields, including employment policy (see Garcia et 
al, 2004). Arguing for the utility of the concept of MLG, also Ian Bache and Matthew 
Flinders present this concept as a theoretical response to the emergence of the multilevel 
European Union. This process has led to the differentiation (dispersal) of authority, both 
vertically to the new levels of governance and horizontally to the new, nonstate actors 
with increased interdependence in both. The MLG concept has proven to be useful to 
capture these complexities and to overcome the rigid distinctions between domestic and 
international politics in order to analyze the implications of the growing interactions 
between governments and nonstate actors across the various levels (see Bache and 
Flinders, 2004). Ian Bache and Rachel Chapman in a recent paper (2008) have further 
elaborated MLG concept at the subnational territorial levels. They point out that “The 
literature on multilevel governance has typically focused on contestation and cooperation 
between a cross section of political actors organized at various territorial levels. In this 
context, the role and authority of state has been challenged by the increased 
engagement of supranational, subnational and nonstate actors. (…) Its emphasis is on 
the growing importance of both horizontal and vertical interdependence in the context of 
European integration that is between actors located at different territorial levels and from 
public, private and voluntary sectors. A characteristic feature of this kind of policy-
making is the prominence of „territorially overarching policy networks‟.” (2008: 397-398). 
The extension of democratic institutional structures and practices from governance 
to multilevel governance has been a big stride in the democratization of the EU but some 
basic weaknesses of the emerging multilevel and multiactor democracy have also come 
to the surface. In general, the recently emerging world order can be characterized by the 
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unprecedented unity and unprecedented fragmentation that has been exacerbated by the 
global crisis. The EU polity as well as the member states‟ polities can also be 
characterized in the same way. For the parallel processes of fragmentation and 
integration James Rosenau coined the term “fragmegration”. The MLG approach can 
serve as a “prime mechanism” to steer the tension between the – external and internal -
fragmentation and integration (Bache and Flinders, 2004:1,5). If representative 
democracy is to be extended to the new and new actors at various levels by turning it 
into participatory democracy at macro-, meso- and micro-levels, then the three following 
questions arise: (1) who decides about the entry of new actors to the particular 
policymaking processes, (2) what kind of regulation is imposed upon the relationships of 
the actors in that given process and (3) how the accountability is applied to these actors. 
The MLG principle has also a big deficiency that has been called a “Faustian Bargain”, or 
better to say “Faustian Dilemma”. It turns out that the old model, “civil society has to 
control the state” has become inefficient and outdated, since the borderline between 
state and civil society has been blurred with the mass of the new “unregulated” civil 
actors that have entered the policymaking process. The real question is, how to control 
the new actors, i.e. “how to control the controllers” that needs a new model of 
democracy with the change of paradigm. It applies also to the old member states but 
even more so to the new ones, but it applies first of all to the regulation of the new world 
order, which goes far beyond the topic of this paper. 
The “political control and accountability remain just as critical as ever to 
democratic government”, given the continued extension of representative democracy to a 
multiactor democracy. In a word, the MLG itself does not provide the political 
accountability dimension for representative democracy and therefore it may lead to an 
increasing democratic deficit. Thus, Guy Peters and Jon Pierre “highlight the perils and 
dangers associated with such governance in terms of participation, accountability, 
transparency, and inclusion.” (Peters and Pierre, 2004:76-77). The Faustian Bargain 
according to them is that by this extension one can gain efficiency in the policymaking 
process at a price of losing accountability, therefore they also separate “performance” 
and “democracy” as analytical devices to point out the main problem: higher efficiency at 
the price of compromised “democracy”. One can cope better with diversity and 
complexity in a widening universe of public policy in the extension of the MLG structures 
but this new arrangement necessitates a new type of political control and leadership. The 
answer to this new problem is the democratically constructed and controlled 
metagovernance as explained below, since otherwise more efficiency will cause less 
accountability and increased democratic deficit at both ends, at the top and bottom of the 
EU polity. In a word, the next step of democratic institution building in the new member 
states as well as in the West Balkan and the new neighbour states is creating, or further 
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developing, the multilevel and multiactor democracy that can also be an institutional 
channel for the bottom-up Europeanization and Democratization. This democratization 
strategy of the new member states at the same time runs parallel with that of the EU, 
given the striking similarities between them concerning their democratic deficits. 
The extension of representative democracy through the MLG process into some 
kind of the troubled participatory democracy has not only created new democracy deficit 
in the EU but also some marked policy asymmetries between policy fields given the lack 
of coordination between economic, social and territorial cohesion. The economic cohesion 
of the EU has always been in the forefront in the EU with a constant effort to balance or 
complete it by social cohesion. Due to the relative failure of the Lisbon Strategy and its 
renewal in 2005, the “growth and jobs” approach has diminished the importance of social 
cohesion in order to enhance the economic competitiveness in the global arena. In the 
first decade, however, territorial cohesion/dimension has been relatively neglected, 
although the initial set up of the Lisbon Strategy has identified the regions (NUTS2) as 
the basic units of the competitiveness and it has exposed the territorial cohesion in the 
EU as a basic objective. In fact, territorial cohesion has been pushed back, since the 
clash between economic and social cohesion has been a heavy problem/tension in all 
member states, while the territorial cohesion has only been a partial problem, mostly 
limited to the less developed member states. It has been felt by the net payer member 
states as an overload and unnecessary burden and they have emphasized all the time 
that the territorial assistance has been counterproductive and inefficient, so it has to be 
(re-)nationalized. Eastern enlargement has increased this “second” debate, first of all 
after the entry of the East Balkan states. The debate has been reinforced by Spain with 
its phasing out stage losing interest in cohesion policy, as the UK earlier in the nineties. 
The Lisbon Strategy has to be renewed for the next decade in 2011 and this policy 
asymmetry between economic, social and territorial cohesion has to be corrected, 
otherwise the second decade may also be a relative failure of Lisbon Strategy in the 
enlarged EU27. 
 
Overcoming of the new weaknesses by the extended metagovernance 
 
The MLG approach stresses the distinction between government and governance, 
but this does not mean at all that the national governments will be fatally weakened, and 
a “super-government” will not appear at the EU level either. This concept presupposes 
the continued importance of nation states at various territorial levels and throughout the 
policy process, i.e. the governments will have more multilevel deconcentration parallel 
with the widening decentralization along the governance line. Basically, there is also “a 
growing recognition of the role of states in shaping and regulating governance (…) as 
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metagovernance.” (Bache and Flinders, 2004:201). If the MLG is going to overcome the 
weakness of losing democratic legitimacy, then also some new means have to be found 
to empower citizens to cope effectively with this shifting location of power. The electoral 
legitimacy of national governments ensures them pivotal role in this changing context, 
but the diffusion of competences and the changing patterns of participation demand 
some additional mechanisms of accountability beyond those provided by representative 
institutions. Consequently, “the evolving structures of multi-level governance are likely to 
necessitate new forms and models of accountability that seek to build new and innovative 
conduits between the public and the institutions involved in complex networks. In 
essence, this may involve a fundamental reappraisal of the meaning of democracy and 
the role of representative institutions within nation states.” (Bache and Flinders, 
2004:205). 
The extension of representative democracy to participatory, multiactor democracy 
overstretches the frames of democratic accountability and legitimacy, and it demands a 
parallel change or extension in the control mechanisms. The basic idea for this 
mechanism in the form of metagovernance at the top has come from Bob Jessop. He has 
elaborated the idea about the continuing centrality of the state as metagovernance, with 
respect to its capacity providing the ground rules for governance and regulatory order 
through which governance partners can pursue their aims: “For political authorities (on 
and across all levels) are becoming more involved in all aspects of metagovernance: they 
get involved in redesigning markets, in constitutional change and the juridical re-
regulation of organizational forms and objectives, in the overall process of collibration.” 
(Jessop, 2004: 65). Jessop here gives a long list of the metagovernance functions, 
namely metagovernance provides the ground rules for governance and regulatory order 
in and through which the governance partners can pursue their aims, and it ensures the 
compatibility or coherence of different governance mechanisms and regimes. This central 
authority acts as the primary organizer of the dialogue among policy communities, and 
deploys a relative monopoly of organizational intelligence and information by helping in 
the self-understanding of identities, strategic capacities and the real interests of the 
individual and collective actors in various social contexts. It serves as some kind of “court 
of appeal” for disputes arising within and over governance and it seeks to rebalance 
power differentials by strengthening weaker organizations to enhance social integration 
and cohesion. Finally, the metagovernance has the basic function to assume the political 
responsibility in the event of governance failure. This long list can be further widened and 
explained from different sides but it already demonstrates clearly that this central 
authority, the state at the national level does not lose its importance with the shift from 
government to governance. Just to the contrary it gains new importance through these 
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vital functions without which the emergence and extension of the MLG would lead to 
chaos and to the weakening of the democratic order and legitimacy. 
It is not enough, however. By the extension of representative democracy not only 
national but also the EU transnational democracy has changed its meaning. The workings 
of the EU necessitate increased metagovernance at the new top or peak institutions in 
the form of the renewal in the Big Power Triangle of the Council, Commission and 
Parliament. As Jessop explains, “(T)he European Union can be seen as a major and, 
indeed, increasingly important, supranational instance of multi-level metagovernance in 
relation to a wide range of complex and interrelated problems.” Metagovernance has also 
the function to elaborate the long-term Grand Strategy for Europe. In the Big Power 
Triangle “The European Council is the political metagovernance network of prime 
ministers that decides on the overall political dynamic around economic and social 
objectives (…) The European Commission plays a key metagovernance role in organizing 
parallel power networks, providing expertise and recommendations, developing 
benchmarks, monitoring progress, promoting mutual learning, and ensuring continuity 
and coherence across presidencies. This is associated with increasing networking across 
old and new policy fields at the European level as well as with a widening range of 
economic, political and social forces that are being drawn into multi-level consultation, 
policy formulation and policy implementation.” (Jessop, 2004:72). 
Consequently, the pattern of multilevel metagovernance in the EU is still evolving 
and it has the tendency of permanent change and reforms for two reasons. First, there 
are inherent tendencies of failure in all major forms of governance like the market 
failures, so the “governance failures” have also to be corrected and balanced. Second, 
the metagovernance itself may develop its own special “top” failures, hence it needs an 
internal correction mechanisms for its internal renewal. This is the eminent case with the 
creative crisis in which the EU has recently entered a new phase with the second Irish 
No, and it may be even more so in the case of the global financial crisis. From the point 
of view of “multilevel metagovernance”, the MLG concept has to be developed as the 
main profile of “deepening” that presupposes permanent structural transformations in the 
relationship of both the vertical institutional layers and the horizontal actors within the 
EU. Democratically constructed and controlled metagovernance is the solution for 
democratic deficit at both ends, at the top and bottom of the institutional structure. It 
represents the positive sum game or win-win game in democratic politics. 
In the final analysis the European governance can be described in three 
partnership triangles in the EU decision-making in general and in the EU policymaking in 
particular. The first macro partnership triangle is between (1) the EU transnational 
institutions, (2) the nation state institutions and (3) the subnational actors and agencies. 
In the first partnership macro-triangle the nation state intermediates between the EU and 
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regional levels and it transmits the Europeanization effect top-down to the national and 
subnational actors, and it represents their national-local interest bottom up. The second 
meso partnership triangle appears at the member state level between (1) the nation 
state and (2) the social actors horizontally and (3) the territorial actors vertically. In this 
partnership meso-triangle both the social and the territorial policy communities have 
their action fields. The third micro partnership triangle(s) are at the subnational level of 
these social and territorial actors and they have both horizontal and vertical, or both 
policy (sectoral) and territorial dimensions. These partnership micro-triangles have a 
plurality of distinct policy networks or communities, in which the state administration 
units or special state agencies are engaged in active cooperation with the local - social, 
business, civil, territorial - nonstate actors. Altogether, the introduction and extension of 
the MLG structures have caused, indeed, a participatory revolution. Most European 
citizens are aware of this multilevel approach and they actively support it. 
Deepening as usual can also be understood as extending-strengthening the 
subnational-regional governance at the bottom in the framework of the European and 
state governance. However, at the present EU institutional crisis no doubt that in the 
vertical relationship the main reform agenda is in the Scharpf‟s term moving from the 
loose “mutual adjustment” to the organized “joint decision making” between the EU, 
state and regional levels in all the three partnership triangles. In general, both the 
bottom up and the top down directions are necessary for the deepening in the EU. The 
bottom up approach facilitates the workings of MLG structures based on the subsidiary 
principle and the top down as opposite approach strengthens the centralized decision 
making at the top. Nowadays, in the special situation of the Lisbon Treaty‟s ratification 
process it is more important to move more and more to “hierarchical direction”, to the 
“centralization” of European governance in the new increased metagovernance, i.e. the 
institutional reform at the top is now high on the agenda. The new common-community 
policies like climate change, energy and innovation – but also many JHA policies like 
immigration - need more centralized EU institutions as concentrated decision making 
processes at the top, in which the MLG structures at the bottom have also their own very 
important role in both preparing and implementing the centrally made decisions. 
As to the second and third partnership triangles, in the developed member states 
multilevel and multiactor democracies have emerged through an extended system of the 
social dialogue and territorial decentralization (“regionalization”) as well as with relatively 
autonomous and powerful social and territorial actors as “veto points” in the decision 
making system. This multiactor democracy is largely missing or hardly developed in the 
new member states. The social and territorial actors are weak, their competences are 
limited and their role in the decision making system is very restricted. The EU 
membership has meant tremendous pressure for them in this respect, but first of all not 
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in political dimension, but much more in practical dimensions of the cohesion policy for 
an urgent capacity building. There have been some developments in the second 
partnership triangle, in fact the constitutional arrangements are there, but the 
subnational institutions are still weak. Moreover, the third partnership triangles as the 
horizontal policy networks and/or communities at regional level are hopelessly missing or 
weak, so is the system of their vertical network governance that incorporates the 
subregional territorial and social actors (see Commission, 2008b:12). 
This research line of multilevel governance has also been very important for the 
practical reasons of the absorption of the Structural Funds. It is a salient issue not only in 
the old member states, but even more in the new member states. Here the weakly 
developed sector of the mesogovernments and microgovernments, or the low 
institutionalization of the MLG structure in general has always been the biggest obstacle 
to the optimal use of the Funds (see e.g. Dezséri, 2007). The main reason is that at the 
meso-government level - like in a “Bermuda triangle” - the Europeanization efforts 
starting from both sides, from both the top and the bottom have usually disappeared. As 
a result of the post-accession crisis and the early challenge of the MLG structures an 
institutional jungle has appeared in ECE, since governance has been extended without a 
proper regulative system. Drastic transformation of representative democracy has begun 
towards the participatory-inclusive democracy but it is only in its first, controversial 
stage. Thus, nobody knows who is who in the policy-making process and what kinds of 
competences these newly entering actors have, in relations to the state or to each other, 
“controlling the controllers”. The state and civil society have merged to some extent and 
the boundaries have been blurred, so civic organizations do not control the state 
exclusively from outside but also active inside. There will be a long road ahead to build 
the new regulative structures as metagovernance even in the ECE national frameworks 
but this process has speeded up under the global pressure. Accordingly, the latest MLG 
literature has been developed in its two basic dimensions, in both governance-
performance terms and in democratization perspectives that has proven the MLG 
discourse has been and will be the main discourse in the renewal of the EU, even in its 
policies to the neighbours. 
 
II. External governance in the West Balkans and Eastern neighbour states 
 
The clash between policies and institutions 
 
The extended or external EU governance as a transformative linkage policy in fact 
has been based on the mechanisms of “regulatory boundary” (policy) and “organizational 
boundary” (institution). The regulatory boundary covers the specific policy areas, 
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addressed by the agreements, legal obligations and modalities through which compliance 
is monitored. The organizational boundary means those institutions and/or agencies 
through which the third country concerned participates in shaping and implementing the 
decisions. The EU has wanted to elaborate flexible cooperation relationships with these 
boundaries but, obviously, there has been a huge gap between these two clashing and 
confronting mechanisms. The EU has tried to expand the regulatory boundary with new 
and new issues attached to the policy agenda but it has tried even more to limit the 
organizational boundary, since it has created only minimal common institutions and has 
expressed its unilateralism very forcefully by formulating the substance of the 
agreements. Thus the major weakness of the widening policy has been its low level MLG 
type of institutionalization in the spirit of the famous saying by Romano Prodi: 
“everything but institutions”. He has meant by that the EU can elaborate some regulatory 
mechanisms for the extended governance formulated in bilateral agreements but the EU 
will not establish common institutions with the countries concerned in order to avoid and 
to exclude the sovereignty-sharing procedures (Lavanex et al, 2008:1, see also on the 
ENP in general Blockmans and Lazowski (2008), De Bardeleben (2008) and Varwick and 
Lang (2007). 
The EU has aimed at the institution building in the West Balkan countries but not 
so much creating “shared institutions” between the EU and the WB countries. In addition, 
the EU has focused so far only on the first partnership triangle as macrogovernance, or 
on the state to state relations. By launching the first reform waves of the public 
administration the main aim of the EU has been the nation-building that has still been 
uncompleted so far. Therefore, the EU has neglected the second and third partnership 
triangles within the WB countries. The EU has promoted the sectoral integration in some 
policy fields and wanted to offer assistance to build up the proper institutions at the 
macro level but it has not realized, or it has not arrived at this task, that it can only be 
promoted and/or implemented properly, if the supporting subnational institutions exist in 
the West Balkan states. The failure of the East Balkan states – Bulgaria and Romania – in 
building up the basic institutions could have been a warning sign for the EU but this 
negative experience has not yet been taken into consideration enough so far (see 
Andreev, 2008). 
The National Strategy for Development and Integration in the WB has been funded 
by the IPA (only the first two out of five for the potential candidates) 
(1) support for transition and institution building 
(2) cross border cooperation 
(3) regional development leading to cohesion policy 
(4) human resources development leading to cohesion policy 
(5) rural development leading to CAP. 
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Although the WB integration process and Eastern Partnership differs a lot, the lack 
or weakness of the shared institution is common in these differing cases. Sandra Lavanex 
and her co-authors have formulated this basic contradiction very markedly between the 
ENP model based on the enlargement process with conditionalities and the lack of proper 
institutions for its implementation. Simply said, the fundamental difference is that the 
ENP has not intended to create a “legally homogeneous” space with the neighbouring 
countries: “In practical terms, however, the EU considers its own „standards‟ as a model, 
which third countries might want to follow. The resemblance to the enlargement 
mechanisms, which finds expression by the reference to the concepts of „approximation‟ 
and the commitment to „shared values‟, is also displayed in the political nature of 
„monitoring of compliance‟ under ENP. The characteristic features are unilateral „progress‟ 
reports drawn up by the European Commission and the ensuing discussions in the 
various formats of the AA and PCA Councils. (…) Put differently, the shift of the 
organisational boundary is very limited and does not include any participation in decision-
shaping. To conclude, neighbourhood relations differ from conventional external relations 
in that the EU displays a strong interest of exporting its regulatory policies to the 
neighbouring countries while at the same time it lacks its most successful foreign policy 
instrument: accession conditionality.” (Lavenex et al, 2008:4). 
In this respect the relationship between the EU and the ENP countries differs 
basically from that of between the EU and the developed European partner countries in 
matters of institutionalized patterns of interaction on governance. While in the case of 
Western neighbours the shift of the regulatory boundary has been accompanied with the 
opening and widening of the institutional boundary at the same time through granting 
membership for them in EU agencies and programmes, in the ENP case the tension has 
grown through the constant widening of the regulatory boundary but without opening the 
organizational boundary. This tension or asymmetry has become the major obstacle to 
the further development of the ENP. The above quoted co-authors argue that “As the 
experience of the Western neighbours shows, participation in such structures is not only 
supportive to the third countries‟ approximation to the EU policies, it also increases the 
sense of partnership and co-ownership, thus fostering the legitimacy of such regulatory 
approximation.” (Lavenex et al, 2008:4). 
No doubt that this principle of “no common institutions” has to be given up and 
the EU has to establish common institutions at distinct governing levels with joint 
decision-making processes in order to make the ENP effective and efficient, since the low 
level of institutionalization has been the main reason for its improper working and 
moderate success so far. EU has to facilitate the bottom-up Europeanization and 
Democratization of its neighbours by building common institutions in the framework of 
multilevel and multiactor democracy. In addition to this regulatory-institutional 
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asymmetry a large geographically based institutional asymmetry can be noticed in the 
ENP between the two big regions. Given its historical advantage, the Southern rim has 
elaborated a rather wide but weak institutional framework, e.g. the regular Euro-
Mediterranean Ministerial meetings with its annual work programmes. In Eastern Europe 
the institutional framework in general and the bilateral, country specific institutions in 
particular have been very much lagging behind, actually almost missing. 
Altogether, the main MLG reform line in the ENP is moving from the “regulatory 
boundary” to “organisational boundary” as a shift from the present asymmetry to more 
participatory relationship. In Scharpf‟s terms it means moving basically from the 
“hierarchical direction” to “joint decision making”, or at least from the spontaneous 
“mutual adjustment” to “intergovernmental negotiations”. This process in practical terms 
would be approaching to the situation in the more developed European countries (EEA 
states and Switzerland) also in the case of the ENP partners, since this relationship with 
the developed countries is much less “regulatory” and more based on the active 
participation in the common institutions and organizations. The EU politicians and experts 
have realized that the fundamental nature of the EU polity is its multilevel character. But 
they have not yet realized that the relationship is the same with the ENP partners, since 
widening, as extending of the European governance to the state and nonstate actors, and 
to state and substate levels, presupposes a MLG structure as well. Therefore the more 
MLG type of governance is introduced in the ENP, the better and more efficient these 
bilateral and multilateral relationships would be. The extended EU governance as 
unilaterally imposing “regulations” upon the ENP partners has reached its limits, in fact, it 
has become counter-productive. The improvement of relationship is possible only through 
the common institution building, i.e. creating “organizations” to make the EU regulations 
feasible. Transformative regionalism in the Emerson‟s terms with its MLG structure can 
only be successful, if it is at the same time a compensatory regionalism offering 
substantial advantages for the neighbouring states instead of EU membership. 
 
Conclusion: the emerging “glocal” governance 
 
The increasing globalization already in the nineties speeded up and strengthened 
to a great extent the “regionalization” efforts worldwide. Regionalization means here the 
continent-size transnational formations like the EU, NAFTA and ASEAN. In the present 
decade this process has not only continued but further strengthened and it has also 
shown the signs of the “spill over effect” to other levels as well. The stronger is the 
impact of globalization on all other territorial levels, the more the transnational regions, 
countries and subnational regions organize and strengthen also their smaller territorial 
units. The “glocal” governance is a reaction to the danger coming from the global 
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uncertainties as an arch of the multilevel governance from the global governance to the 
local governance: the global-local linkage. Thus, the global governance is basically a 
strengthened local governance and basic democracy under the global pressure at the 
level of local communities. Glocal governance is both a transition from global to local 
governance and an arch of institutions between the two ends. It proves that globalization 
penetrates not only countries and subnational regions but also the much smaller 
territorial units and communities, and under its pressure even the local governance 
needs a reconstruction. 
Actually, the big periods of the EU development have been created by the deep 
transformations as milestones of the world system. The first period ended in 1973 with 
the first enlargement that opened up the core Europe to a continental power through 
series of enlargements, and the second one in 1991 (Maastricht Treaty) with the collapse 
of the bipolar world turned the EU into a global actor. In 2008 the third period came to 
an end with the outbreak of global crisis, and around 2010/2011 a new, fourth period will 
begin that will differ from the present EU beyond recognition. The EU is in a creative 
crisis and some outlines of the “new EU” in a “new Europe” can already be seen based on 
a MLG type of structure with an extended external governance and deepened internal 
governance. In the democratic renewal of the EU - also in its relationship with the 
neighbours – a new European identity and civil society cooperation will emerge (see 
Kostakopolou, 2008, Ruzza and Bozzini, 2008). 
 
By Attila Ágh, project leader 
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